
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: CENTRALIZING CLASS WARRIOR

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Abstract

Abraham Lincoln was the great centralizer. His War of 1861 was only the tip of the iceberg in this regard. This core of his philosophy can also be seen in his “contributions” to class warfare, the American “system” of public works, strong tariff protection, public lands policy, welfare payments to large corporate interests, and in the contrasts between the Confederate and the U.S. Constitutions.

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1. Introduction

Abraham Lincoln is most famous for suppressing Southern Secession. But this in turn has suppressed appreciation for this contribution to several other aspects of American society. To wit, his championing of class warfare (section II), his support for corporate welfare (section III) and his use of public lands policy to support centralization (section IV). In order to more starkly analyze his “contribution” to U.S. political economy, we also compare and contrast in section V the Confederate Constitution to that of the victors of the War Between the States. We conclude in section VI.

2. Class warrior

DiLorenzo (1998, 244) made a strong case against Lincoln as, “...the Great Centralizer, whose policies did much to undermine the decentralized, federal system established by the Founders.” We contend that Lincoln was a “Class Warrior,” or, at the very least, his principles did not prevent him from stooping to engage in class warfare to achieve his political and economic ends. And class warfare is a way of life of centralizers and their systems. Lincoln was a precursor of every American centralizer of the late 19th and 20th centuries, including, notably, Franklin Delano

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Roosevelt. Certainly, class warfare was a feature of the New Deal, America's greatest centralization effort of the 20th century, and FDR, the leader thereof, routinely engaged in class warfare, as have other, lesser American centralizers of the late 19th and 20th centuries.¹

The following two (2) quotes from an "Address to the People of Illinois" signed by A. Lincoln, S. T. Logan, and A. T. Bledsoe as printed in a "Campaign Circular from Whig Committee" of March 4, 1843, are illustrative of Lincoln's class warfare.

"And again, by the tariff system, the whole revenue is paid by the consumers of foreign goods, and those chiefly, the luxuries, and not the necessities of life. By this system, the man who contents himself to live upon the products of his own country, pays nothing at all. And surely, that country is extensive enough, and its products abundant and varied enough, to answer all the real wants of its people. In short, by this system, the burthen of revenue falls almost entirely on the wealthy and luxurious few, while the substantial and laboring many who live at home, and upon home products, go entirely free" (Basler 1953, 311).

"One [reason given against Clay's land bill] is, that by giving [the states] the proceeds of the public lands, we impoverish the National Treasury,² and thereby render necessary an increase in the tariff. This may be true, but if so, the amount of it only is, that those whose pride, whose abundance of means, prompt them to spurn the manufactures of their own country, and to strut in British cloaks, and coats, and pantaloons, may have to pay a few cents more on the yard for the cloth that makes them. A terrible evil, truly, to the Illinois farmer, who never wore, nor never [sic] expects to wear, a single yard of British goods in his whole life" (Basler 1953, 313, footnote added).

FDR (<http://www.knowprose.com/node/12218>) learned well the lesson of class warfare at his predecessor's knee. He is responsible for the following statements:

"We know now that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by organized mob.... [The organized moneyed people] are unanimous in their hate for me and I welcome their hatred.... I should like to have it said of my... administration that these forces met their master."

"The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little."

Popular opinion usually "credits" Marx (1848) as the creator of class warfare. And, indeed, there is some justification for such a claim, for he makes it very clearly:

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle."

¹ And, of course, class warfare is of the essence of Communism, and was an very important element in Naziism's ascent to power, witness the Nazi Party Brownshirts. Certainly, in the 20th Century, we have seen all of the great centralizers, whether of the more virulent or less virulent stripe, employ class warfare as a means to their ends.

² Note the use of "the National Treasury" rather than, say, "the Federal Treasury" or "the United States Treasury".

However, this sentiment is a “made-in-America” phenomenon. Pride of place must be given to Saint Abraham, in that his statements were made in 1843, a half decade before those made by the Father of Communism.

A more modern follower of Lincoln³ in this regard is Edwards (2004) who proclaimed:⁴

“Today, under George W. Bush, there are two Americas, not one: One America that does the work, another that reaps the reward. One America that pays the taxes, another America that gets the tax breaks. One America - middle-class America - whose needs Washington has long forgotten, another America - narrow-interest America - whose every wish is Washington's command. One America that is struggling to get by, another America that can buy anything it wants, even a Congress and a president.”⁵

3. Early corporate welfare

DiLorenzo (1998, 255, footnote added) avers that, “[t]he political topic that *did* draw most of [Lincoln's] attention was the economic policy platform of the Whig Party, which from 1820 until the early 1850s was literally defined by Lincoln's political idol, Henry Clay.⁶ As Johannson (1991) has written, ‘From the moment Lincoln first entered political life as a candidate for the state legislature during the decisive 1832 presidential election, [Lincoln] had demonstrated an unswerving fidelity to the party of Henry Clay and to Clay's American System, the program of internal improvements, protective tariff, and centralized banking’ (14).” And, “The three main elements of Clay's American System were federally funded ‘internal

³ This also applies to the prosecutorial side of the Conrad Black law case; a large part of the charges against him consist of the complaint that he is a very rich man. Even the media have joined in this class warfare, characterizing him as a “media baron” (<http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2005/11/17/black-051117.html>). But a baron was given special political and legal privileges (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baron>), something no one even contends is true in this case. A similar pattern was responsible for the prosecution of the case against Microsoft; Bill Gates is also very rich. See on this Anderson, et al, 2001.

⁴ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22230-2004Jul28.html>

⁵ A sharp critic (<http://georgiaunfiltered.blogspot.com/2007/07/john-edwards-two-americas400-haircuts.html>) maintains that the real difference between the “two Americas” is that one pays \$1250 for a haircut, and the other only \$400. For more on the hairstyling habits of this particular class warrior, see <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18157456/>. According to *Maclean's Magazine* (May 7, 2007, p. 62): “The man who portrayed himself as a foe of Wall Street didn't last long as a man of the people. In 2005, John Edwards gave a speech railing against ‘two economies in this country: one for wealthy insiders and then one for everybody else.’ This week, the Washington Post described how Edwards soon went to work for Fortress Investment Group, a fast rising U.S. hedge fund and a tax sheltered epitome of the ‘wealthy insider’ economy.” For more class warrior-ship see Krugman, 2002, for a specific critique of Krugman, see Coyne, 2002. For general criticism of this doctrine, see DiLorenzo, 2002b; Mises, 1927, 1977; Noonan, 2001.

⁶ Although “the economic policy platform of the Whig Party” may have been “literally defined by ... Henry Clay,” its lineage can be traced back to Hamilton, and his antecedents (Hamilton, 1964 [1791]).

improvements,' considered by many to be nothing but corporate welfare for steamship, canal, and railroad businesses; high protective tariffs, leading to economic autarky; and central banking and fiat money. In short the Clay-Lincoln system consisted of mercantilism, protectionism, the centralization of governmental power, and inflationism" (DiLorenzo 1998, 256).

But this was only the tip of the iceberg, historically speaking, in terms of business socialism. Hughes (1977) and Horwitz (1977) have demonstrated that business regulation of this sort was hardly begun by Lincoln; it dates back to the very founding of the republic.⁷ However, Kolko (1963, 1970) has shown during the progressive period, hard on the heels of Lincoln's days of influence, there was a significant upward ratchet in special privileges for well connected businessmen. Kolko, moreover, gave evidence that large scale capitalists were in the forefront of these initiatives: regulations were *not* promulgated by well meaning politicians and civil servants in order to protect consumers against rapacious firms, and then, only later, were the regulators "captured" (Stigler, 1971, Peltzman, 1976) by business interests. No, these legislative enactments (e.g., the FDA) were set up at the outset at the *behest* of special corporate interests.

4. Public lands

Although most historians maintain that the essence of Clay's American System (CAS)⁸ consisted of the tariff, internal improvements, and central banking-cum-fiat money, in fact, there was a fourth main element: public-lands policy. The issue of the funding of internal improvements was, or became, inextricably bound to the public-lands policy (itself, inseparable from tariff policy).⁹ This requires elucidation.

The economic nationalists, the centralizers, wanted the "nation" to develop in a specific, "balanced" fashion. The East (New England and the Mid-Atlantic States) would be the provenance of manufacturing and commerce, both domestic and international. The South and West would provide, on the one hand, the raw materials for the factories and the food for labor, and, on the other hand, markets for the goods manufactured in the factories. (Obviously, the South and West would also specialize; e g., the South in cotton and the West in grains and livestock.) The sections would be tied together by a system of "internal improvements;" i. e., a

⁷ Rothbard, 2000 traces the rot even further back in time.

⁸ Today, many refer to "Clay's American System" as "*The American System*," perhaps rightfully, though deplorably, so, because, though it is truly un-American in the sense of the principles of the War for Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution of the United States of America, it has come to be the system of America. Those who deserve major discredit for this turn of events are far too numerous to name, but to mention a few presidents, in addition to Lincoln: McKinley, T. Roosevelt, W. Wilson, H. Hoover, F. Roosevelt, L. Johnson, R. Nixon, and W. Clinton.

⁹ Peterson, for example, maintains that "[i]n the theory of the American System internal improvements should be financed as they were at their inception, by income from the sale of the public lands" (Peterson, 1987, 83).

transportation system.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the Americans would not cooperate with this “progressive” central planning. They were developing their country as free men are wont to do – through voluntary interactions with their fellow men. (Centralizers do not perceive the spontaneous order that is the natural, though unintended, consequence of such free market activity; rather, without an order imposed from without, as by government, they think that people acting willy-nilly in free markets cause economic chaos¹¹).

CAS, then, was to be the means to the centralizers’ end; and, as such, it was an integrated package. By protecting the American market for manufactures from foreign (read British, primarily) competition, the tariff would promote industrialization. Internal improvements, developed with governmental support, would link southern and western supplies of agricultural and natural resources, and markets for manufactured goods, to the industrial East. And, the financing of manufacturing would be facilitated by a central bank and fiat money. That would provide, directly or indirectly, easy credit for the manufacturers; while the financing of internal improvements would be assisted by tariff revenues, net of those necessary to operate the federal government. The centralizers’ policy prescriptions, as embodied in CAS, then, were designed to affect their vision for the U. S. Unfortunately for the centralizers, a major problem developed.

Essentially, the problem was that the federal government’s receipts exceeded¹² its revenue requirements; and that, despite the fact that these requirements were increasing. Virtually all of the federal government’s receipts, from the inception of the Union through the first third of the 19th century, were generated by the tariff and the sale of public lands. In fact, during that period *receipts from the tariff, alone, exceeded the total expenditures of the federal government by some \$8,000,000* (Table 1). Moreover, during the same period, the revenues generated from the sale of public lands, that had been dedicated to, and used for, servicing the federal debt,¹³ grew rapidly, and exceeded \$44,000,000 (Table 1). The result was that, the debt was repaid to under \$34 thousand in 1835 from a high of over \$127 million in 1816 (appendix). Therefore, the revenue from the sale of public lands became available to the treasury to fund the operations of the government.¹⁴ Unless something was done, there would be no justification for the prevailing, high tariff rates (Taussig, 1967, Part I).

¹⁰ This transportation system was to consist of railroads, canals, and steamboats transiting navigable rivers; and, “internal improvements” meant the construction of the railroads and canals, and the clearing of obstacles to navigation on rivers.

¹¹ Assuming they are good faith centralizers, and not merely taking such positions for their own narrow self-interest.

¹² No matter how this may appear to the modern eye, this is *not* a misprint.

¹³ “After the War [of 1812] they [the public lands] were pledged to the payment of the national [sic] debt...” (Peterson, 1987, 83).

¹⁴ “... as long as the [public] debt was formidable little thought was given to shaping land policy to further the goals of economic development” (Peterson, 1987, 83).

Table 1¹⁵

All data are in 000s of \$.

Period	Total Outlays*	Total Revenue**	Customs Revenue	Revenue from the Sale of Public Lands
1789-1833	615,818	722,103	623,940	44,596
1834-1860	1,114,949	1,083,634	911,632	130,354
1789-1860	1,730,767	1,805,737	1,535,572	174,940

* Includes receipts of the Post Office to the extent they exceeded expenses.

** Includes expenses of the Post Office to the extent they exceeded receipts.

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957.

This brought to the fore the complex issue of what was to be done with the public lands. Should the terms of their sale be designed to generate revenue or promote settlement? And, what should be done with the receipts from such sales? On these issues, as well as others, the interests of the East, the West, and the South diverged. Thus, with respect to public lands policy, Peterson (1987, 83, footnotes omitted) states:

“There was a broad consensus on the system of disposing of the lands. (In 1820 land could be purchased at auction at federal land offices for the minimum price of \$1.25 an acre in the minimum quantity of eighty acres.) This did not mitigate the continuing tension between the two objects of settlement and revenue. Settlement was uppermost in the western mind, while revenue was the primary concern in the East. In the eyes of many easterners, above all the economic nationalists, public lands were at best a mixed blessing. They drained off labor and capital from the East, where both were wanted for growth of manufactures – indeed, for the whole complex of arts and industries of advancing civilization – and dispersed them in the slow and exhausting work of frontier development. Richard Rush, Adam’s secretary of treasury, summarized the argument in one of his annual [1827] reports: ‘It is a proposition, too plain to require elucidation, that the creation of capital is retarded, rather than accelerated, by the diffusion of a thin population over a great surface of soil. Any thing that may serve to hold back this tendency to diffusion from racing too far, and too long, into an extreme, can scarcely prove otherwise than salutary.’ Perhaps the most effective check on this potentially crippling dispersal of national energies was the protective tariff. The redundant farm population in the East, instead of going west and adding to the agricultural surplus, would be absorbed into factories and become consumers of that surplus....[a]nother means of counteracting the natural pull of the frontier...was a land policy slanted to revenue.”

¹⁵ Annual data for the years 1789-1860 on the series in this table are provided in an appendix.

And, Frayssé (1988, 104, footnote added) viewed the conflict over public lands policy as follows:

“The working class favored homestead legislation, or, as a last resort, preemption laws. The ‘old states’ of the East, where there were no longer any public lands, favored maintaining the *status quo* (selling at \$1.25 an acre) unless they could obtain something in return. The states of the West favored either distribution of public lands (or the product of their sales) to the states in which they were located as an encouragement to public works or preemption, which allowed farmers to round out their holdings...The South in general had no interest at all in distribution and likewise feared preemption, which contributed to the development of the free states of the Northwest and their rapid population growth.”¹⁶

Public lands policy, then, was problematical, at best, for the centralizers. What was wanted was a program that would hamper settlement, while not obviating the need for high tariff rates. Although a number of approaches were broached, most amounted to variations on the theme of distribution. A public lands policy geared to revenue generation and the distribution thereof for the purpose of internal improvements would be the ideal solution. Thus, Baxter (1995, 53) maintains that, “... another way to develop transportation involved distribution of proceeds from public-land sales for this purpose to the states...[it] offered an alternative to direct federal involvement, and Clay would tirelessly labor for it the rest of his career.”

Peterson (1987, 231, footnote omitted, emphasis added) states that:

“Clay called March 1 [1933] ‘perhaps the most important congressional day that ever occurred.’ It was a personal triumph, of course, ‘the most proud and triumphant day of my life,’ he told Matt Davis. The House sent the Force Bill, the Senate both the Compromise Bill and the Land Bill, to the president for signature. The latter was the almost forgotten child of the session. In December Clay had introduced the same measure the Senate had approved and the House had postponed in the previous session. Again the Public Lands Committee reported its own bill; again, the Senate adopted Clay’s plan for distribution of the proceeds of the sale of public lands to the states. *After years of discussion the question was well understood. If the income of the Land office was excluded from the revenue to support the [federal] government, government would be solely dependent on the tariff, which would tend to perpetuate the American System.* Logically, then, distribution was part of the compromise, another compensatory device, like home valuation, to keep up the tariff.”

And, Frayssé (1988, 104, emphasis added) asserted that:

“The compromise law of 1841 satisfied no one. It linked distribution and preemption so as to provide the strict minimum indispensable for the western states, but Clay failed in his effort to get the support of the East by linking distribution and

¹⁶ Distribution meant the distribution of the revenue obtained from the sale of the public lands to the states, primarily for the purpose of funding internal improvements. Preemption meant laws that granted a preemptive right to the title of a limited amount of public lands to those who actually settled thereon and improved the land.

the tariff. On the contrary, distribution would come to an end each time the tariff rose above 20 percent. *It became impossible to do what Clay had hoped: to empty the federal treasury by distributing the product of the sale of public lands so as to make the increase of customs duties inevitable.* Instead, distribution ceased in 1842 as the tariff climbed.”

Another link between public lands policy and centralization was that distribution was also designed to get the states hooked on the Barmecidal sugar-teat of federal money.¹⁷ President Jackson pocket vetoed the Land Bill. He “...now opposed distribution in any form. Clay’s bill was a ruse for federal support of local internal improvements; it would turn the states into mendicants of the Government in Washington. ‘A more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised,’ Jackson declared. ‘Money is power, and in that Government which pays...will all political power be consolidated’ ” (Peterson, 1987, 232, footnote omitted).

As to Lincoln’s position: “Lincoln had defined his program clearly during the campaign [of 1836]. He favored the distribution of federal lands to the states in which they were located in order ‘to dig canals and construct rail roads, without borrowing money and paying interest on it.’ Land distribution appeared to be merely a means of developing internal improvements, and we shall see that the desire to reach that goal would take precedence over all other considerations” (Frayssé, 1988, 70-71, footnote omitted).

Frayssé (1988, 77) also states that:

“Lincoln henceforth [after January 1839] was completely committed to the idea that public lands should serve exclusively to finance industrial and commercial development through the intermediary of public works. He made no further efforts to conciliate the interest of squatters, workers, and urban artisans who wanted cheap land, or if possible, free land with those of public works entrepreneurs, railroad companies, and large merchants (who wanted to appropriate the product of the sale of the lands in the form of contracts for equipment and commercial profits) or with those of large financial creditors of the states and the federal government (who did not want to watch placidly as the goods of their debtors were dissipated).”

We see, then, that the public lands policy was an integral part of CAS, and, as one would suspect, Lincoln, following his political hero, Clay, was on the wrong side of the issue. And, it avails naught to point to Lincoln’s homestead policy introduced during the War for Southern Independence. That was strictly an expedient intended to aid in the prosecution of the war.

5. The Confederate Constitution

In the view of DiLorenzo (1998, 259):

“The Confederate Constitution was essentially a carbon copy of the U.S. Constitution, except for the following provisions, all of which dilute the power of the central government (DeRosa 1992): protectionist tariffs were unconstitutional;

¹⁷ In the current parlous state of the union, the effects of such addiction should be obvious to all.

government subsidies to private businesses were outlawed; no government funds could be spent on ‘internal improvements’ except for dredging rivers and harbors; all congressional appropriations required a two-thirds majority vote, although a majority vote could be held if requested by the president; the president was given a line-item veto and limited to one six-year term; states could initiate constitutional amendments but Congress could not; central government officials could be impeached by the state legislatures as well as by the House of Representatives; and the general welfare clause of the U.S. Constitution was eliminated.”¹⁸

However, six (6) other significant differences between the two (2) constitutions deserve mention.¹⁹ Of these, five (5) did indeed diminished the power of the central government but one (1) did augment it. The Constitution of the Confederate States of America contained the following provisions.

First, Article I, Section 8, Clause 7, mandated that the Post Office become self-sufficient, in very short order: “...but the expenses of the Post Office Department, after the first day of March, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and sixty-three, shall be paid out of its own revenue...” Given the drain that the Postal Service, nee the Post Office, monopoly has been on the U. S. Treasury over the years, the immense amount of patronage involved in the appointment of postmasters, and the vast power of the postal unions, the constraints thereon obviously served the cause of liberty.

Second, Article I, Section 9, Clause 10, prohibited the Congress from entering into cost-plus contracts, or paying, *ex post facto*, cost overruns: “All bills appropriating money shall specify in Federal currency, the exact amount of each appropriation, and the purposes for which it is made; and Congress shall grant no extra compensation to any public contractor, officer, agent or servant, after such contract shall have been made or such service rendered.” Given the cost-overrun abuses involved in, for example, military procurement, such constraints clearly promoted the interests of liberty.

Third, even if, as DiLorenzo implies, the provision in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, that: “...no bounties shall be granted by the treasury” applied only to private businesses, which interpretation is not necessarily correct, Article I, Section 9, Clause 10, also, apparently, prohibited open-ended entitlements, whether to private businesses, individuals or *states*. This constraint prevented what are perhaps the most insidious destroyers of freedom, the “free lunches” that enslave by inducing dependency on governmental largess – in this case dependency of individuals or states on largess from the federal government.²⁰

Fourth, Article I, Section 9, Clause 20, prohibited “Christmas tree” bills: “Every law, or resolution having the force of law, shall relate to but one subject, and that

¹⁸ The Constitution of the CSA can be found at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/csa/csa.htm>.

¹⁹ This, obviously, ignores differences relating to slavery, though such differences between the Confederate Constitution of 1861 and the Union Constitution as it stood in 1861 were not so great as many might think.

²⁰ On this point, see the text associated with footnote 12.

shall be expressed in the title.” By restraining “logrolling,” this constraint advanced the interests of liberty.

Fifth, Article II, Section 2, Clause, 4, prohibited recess appointments of nominees who had been rejected by the senate: “... but no person rejected by the Senate shall be reappointed to the same office during their ensuing recess.” Had the U. S. Constitution such a provision, perhaps we would have been spared Bill Lan Lee at “Justice” (Thomas, 1999). In any case, this provision restrained the power of the president, a desideratum of a society of free people.

Sixth, Article I, Section 9, Clause 6, allowed tariffs to be placed on exports by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of both Houses: “No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State, except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses.” This is the single provision that augmented the central government’s power.

The South, vis a vis the North, has a reputation for backwardness, sloth, for being uncivilized. However, at least with regard adherence to the strictures of private property, economic freedom and free enterprise, it is difficult to see how such an indictment can be sustained.

6. Conclusion

In sum, we have offered a strong indictment of “Honest Abe” as “The Great Centralizer.” DiLorenzo (1998, tba) is directly on target when he states that, “The South’s defeat and subjugation radically changed the very nature of American government from a decentralized, federal system to a consolidated national system and effectively destroyed local sovereignty as an effective check on the centralizing powers of the state.” The points made herein only strengthen this case.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Annual series: total expenditures; total receipts; customs receipts; &, receipts from sales of public lands.

Series #	Y 255	Y 259	Y 260	Y 263		Y 255	Y 259	Y 260	Y 263
Year	Total expenditures	Total receipts	Customs receipts	Receipts from sales of public lands	Year	Total expenditures	Total receipts	Customs receipts	Receipts from sales of public lands
1789-91	4,269	4,419	4,399	-	1826	17,036	25,260	23,341	1,394
1792	5,080	3,670	3,443	-	1827	16,139	22,966	19,712	1,496
1793	4,482	4,653	4,255	-	1828	16,395	24,764	23,206	1,018
1794	6,991	5,432	4,801	-	1829	15,203	24,828	22,682	1,517
1795	7,540	6,115	5,588	-	1830	15,143	24,844	21,922	2,329
1796	5,727	8,378	6,568	5	1831	15,248	28,527	24,224	3,211
1797	6,134	8,689	7,550	84	1832	17,289	31,866	28,465	2,623
1798	7,677	7,900	7,106	12	1833	23,018	33,948	29,033	3,968
Series #	Y 255	Y 259	Y 260	Y 263		Y 255	Y 259	Y 260	Y 263
1799	9,666	7,547	6,610	-	1834	18,628	21,792	16,215	4,858
1800	10,786	10,849	9,081	0.5>	1835	17,573	35,430	19,391	14,758

1801	9,395	12,935	10,751	168	1836	30,868	50,827	23,410	24,877
1802	7,862	14,996	12,438	189	1837	37,243	24,954	11,169	6,776
1803	7,852	11,064	10,479	166	1838	33,865	26,303	16,159	3,082
1804	8,719	11,826	11,099	488	1839	26,899	31,483	23,138	7,076
1805	10,506	13,561	12,936	540	1840	24,318	19,480	13,500	3,293
1806	9,804	15,560	14,668	765	1841	26,566	16,860	14,487	1,366
1807	8,354	16,398	15,846	466	1842	25,206	19,796	18,188	1,336
1808	9,932	17,061	16,364	648	1843	11,858	8,303	7,047	898
1809	10,281	7,773	7,296	442	1844	22,338	29,321	26,184	2,060
1810	8,157	9,384	8,583	697	1845	22,937	29,970	27,528	2,077
1811	8,058	14,424	13,313	1,040	1846	27,767	29,700	26,713	2,694
1812	20,281	9,801	8,959	710	1847	57,281	26,496	23,748	2,498
1813	31,682	14,340	13,225	836	1848	45,377	35,736	31,757	3,329
1814	34,721	11,182	5,999	1,136	1849	45,052	31,208	28,347	1,689
1815	32,708	15,729	7,283	1,288	1850	39,543	43,603	39,669	1,860
1816	30,587	47,678	36,307	1,718	1851	47,709	52,559	49,018	2,352
1817	21,844	33,099	26,283	1,991	1852	44,195	49,847	47,339	2,043
1818	19,825	21,585	17,176	2,607	1853	48,184	61,587	58,932	1,667
1819	21,464	24,603	20,284	3,274	1854	58,045	73,800	64,224	8,471
1820	18,261	17,881	15,006	1,636	1855	59,743	65,351	53,026	11,497
1821	15,811	14,573	13,004	1,213	1856	69,571	74,057	64,023	8,918
1822	15,000	20,232	17,590	1,804	1857	67,796	68,965	63,876	3,829
1823	14,707	20,541	19,088	917	1858	74,185	46,655	41,790	3,514
1824	20,327	19,381	17,878	984	1859	69,071	53,486	49,566	1,757
1825	15,857	21,841	20,099	1,216	1860	63,131	56,065	53,188	1,779

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, pp. 711-712.

Notes to table 1.

1. The receipts and expenditures of the Post Office are netted and the net included in total receipts or total expenditures as the net is positive or negative, respectively.

2. There are two series for “Total gross debt:” 1) Y 257 (pg. 711) noted “as of end of period;” and, “Y 368 (pg. 721), that do not agree with each other. There is a one year shift in the data, such that the same datum that is given for year t debt in the Y 257 series is also given for the year t+1 debt in the Y 368 series, except that in the Y 257 series the years 1789-1791 are combined, whereas in Y 368 series the datum is given for 1791, but not for either 1789 or 1790. The Y 368 series data do agree with the U. S. Treasury Dept. series at: <http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd.opdhisto1.htm>, except for 1835.

3. The series for the annual surplus or deficit, Y256 (pg. 711) is correctly calculated from the receipts and expenditures data. However, this series is inconsistent with the increments to the total gross debt, regardless of which series is used.

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